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Abstract
Digital ventures seek to scale their user base quickly
and effectively across markets in order to lock out
competitors and drive adoption through positive
feedback loops. We view such rapid global scaling as an
organising logic by which ventures replicate a generic
solution to recurring challenges, that are found in
expanding a user base across markets; which is usually
characterized by slight variables in their conditions. We
distinguish and describe this as a process of “generative
pattern replication”, where an existing scaling pattern
is specialised to the specific circumstances of the new
market, and applied there. For our study we looked at
BlaBlaCar, a ridesharing venture that has rapidly
scaled its business into 22 markets, to gain a better
understanding about this generative process. Our
research contributes to the digital innovation literature
by proposing a novel perspective on the scaling of
digital ventures.

1. Introduction
The user base, that is, the number of users who
have registered for a service, is often used as a key
indicator of success for digital ventures [21, 41].
Since it assigns weight and legitimacy to a new digital
service, the velocity of user base growth [28, 30, 34,
38, 41] is a major interest point for any digital
venture. For instance, since its inception in 2009,
Uber scaled its user base to 8 million members in 67
countries [20]. Similarly, Airbnb reached 60 million
users in 190 countries [2].
As unprecedented scaling dynamics become more
commonplace, the industrial-age understanding of
scaling becomes less relevant [45]. Traditionally,
scaling was often associated with acquiring new
resources to expand the capacity of a business to meet
increases in demand [29, 33]. It involved reducing the
cost of production, and a core element in achieving
“economies of scale” was to standardise production
to drive down marginal cost [1, 9].
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Prior research on rapid scaling of the user base of
digital ventures focused on the underlying
mechanisms within a single regional market,
producing explanations for how to build and sustain
momentum [21]. However, many digital ventures are
driven by “winner-takes-it-all” perceptions [11, 19,
32], which leads them to seek rapid scaling across
several markets. This in turn brings about the
challenge of how to expand successfully to a global
foothold, whilst knowing that many markets exhibit
(slightly)
different
characteristics.
As
our
understanding of digital innovation develops [10, 22,
44, 45], it’s important to understand more about the
processes behind digital ventures’ capacities to scale.
Thus, this research addresses the following research
question:
What is the process by which digital ventures
scale their user base across market boundaries?
The approach pertinent to our research is that of
scaling via replication, following a digital organising
logic, as opposed to the industrial-era logic of scaling
via resource acquisition [cf. 29]. To this end, we
provide a case study of BlaBlaCar, a ridesharing
service, which scaled to 25 million users across 22
markets within 9 years. This case serves as the
empirical grounding in which to develop a process
model of scaling through “generative pattern
replication”, wherein an existing pattern is
specialised to the local circumstances and then
leveraged to scale effectively.
A digital venture attains and improves such a
scaling pattern through repeated application of a
replication process: transfer a successful digital
service to a new market, then adapt it to the specific
local conditions, without redefining the service, and
focus on scaling the user base. Once such a process
has been repeated a few times, it forms a generic
pattern that can be applied, and be further improved,
when confronted with a new market.
Leveraging such an emergent pattern allows a
digital venture to scale rapidly through replication,
without the need to reinvent the wheel in each new
market. This is enabled by digital infrastructure and
the specifics of digital technology, and thus a
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departure from traditional scaling strategies. Hence,
our research is a contribution to the digital innovation
literature. It proposes opportunities not only for
research, but also actionable knowledge for growing
successful digital ventures.

2. Conceptual grounding
2.1. Scaling
Chandler [9] offers rich accounts of industrial age
firms and their scaling logic. Scaling of firms such as
General Motors (GM) required substantial up-front
investment for it to build the infrastructure that would
support the scaling efforts of an industrial age firm.
Scaling and growth, as described by the industrial-age
logic in [8, 9, 24, 39], emphasise driving down unit cost
of production to gain competitive advantage [40].
The scaling of ventures such as BlaBlaCar and
Airbnb, suggests a different approach to scaling logic;
as they required considerably less time to scale in
comparison to industrial ones. For example, both
BlaBlaCar and Airbnb expanded into their first foreign
markets three years after their founding, whereas it took
GM fifteen years. Likewise, BlaBlaCar reached twenty
million users in nine years, and Airbnb amassed sixty
million users in only eight years, while GM again lagged
behind, and needed thirty years to have produced twenty
million cars, and another fourteen years to hit the fifty
million mark [2, 4, 20].
One of the starting-point of this paper is that this
difference in scaling can be traced to how digital
ventures draw on already existing digital infrastructures
[cf. 21]. Rather than making significant investments in
proprietary production technologies and distribution
systems, in order to reach economies of scale [9], digital
ventures are able to exploit existing digital
infrastructures. They focus on amassing a large user
base at speed, in a bid to disrupt the market and lock out
competition. This is possible since the costs of
reproducing digital technology, once the initial design is
developed, become negligible [7]. Furthermore, the
modular and layered architecture of digital technology
[18, 45] creates infinite opportunities for flexible
configurations and customisations. It creates
possibilities for cheaply modifying existing
technologies when and where needed to sustain growth.
Digital technology has therefore had a huge impact on
organisations, their strategies [45], and their ability to
scale rapidly [21]. This impact extends beyond the
industrial-age logic to explain scaling, requiring new
approaches suitable for the digital age [26, 31].
Industrial theories of scaling and competitive
advantage rely on a firm’s ability to find and acquire
costly to copy inputs for production and distribution.

Unlike tangible assets, their digital counterparts incur
costs merely at the design stage not during reproduction
and distribution [35]. Moreover, digital technologies
have no natural capacity limits for copies. The
foundation of a competitive advantage, then, is not in
driving down production costs, but rather finding a
superior design, then being able to diffuse it rapidly on
a global scale, that allows for the perfecting of the
design during scaling.
2.2. Network effects as motivation for scaling
One of the motivations for rapid growth is the
prospect of network externalities, derived from the user
base [17, 25, 32, 36, 37]. Many digital ventures are in a
hurry to scale because the power of network effects
helps to achieve and sustain growth that is selfreinforcing. Once the number of users who adopt the
digital technology reaches a critical point, the value of
that platform for potential users increases rapidly. This
creates positive feedback loops and incentives for their
existing users to stay, and others to join become high,
all whilst creating less room for competition [12, 13].
Gaining the momentum of network effects in digital
ventures such as Uber and Airbnb might mean longer
lead times, but these are then followed by explosive
growth (sometimes referred to as ‘hockey stick’ growth
trajectories). As such, scaling in digital ventures is a
strategic imperative, but not to for the achievement of
the production side economies of scale, but for the
demand side economies of scale, granted through the
network effects [35].
Because of such long lead times, and the
significance of the user base, profit, or other financial
metrics, which are often used to measure the success of
a traditional business, do not reflect the true value of a
digital venture. It is foreseeable that for a continued
period of time it may operate at a loss, on the promise
of explosive growth and subsequent profit generation
later. Thus, the size of a user base is an important
success metric, especially when it comes to digital
technology that bank on network effects [25].
2.3. Scaling via replication
When viewing scaling from a global perspective,
digital ventures are faced with a task of meeting local
user needs fast whilst maintaining a competitive global
product and a coherent brand. Schilling [32] looked
beyond idiosyncratic forces in locking out competitive
technologies, to be able to secure winner take all market
dominance (specifically modelling and prediction). The
author highlights the significance of a “hidden order
underlying a complex system” [32, p.395] in an
organisation that allows the leveraging of information
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and knowledge in a way that creates opportunities for
modelling and prediction. Leveraging a system of
previously proven successful and generic solutions, and
then applying them to recurring problems in varied
market conditions is a challenge digital ventures are
faced with when scaling across boundaries.
The nature of digital products and services at its core
is almost a prerequisite for replication. The properties of
digital technology create very favourable conditions and
incentives for ventures to scale rapidly by replication. A
working digitally powered idea, once gained proof of
concept, can be replicated globally with almost instant
market domination. Previously mentioned examples of
Uber and Airbnb quickly proved sustainable ways of
meeting user needs with digital technology, and
replicated the same business model globally, whilst
precisely nailing down local demand specificities.
Replication as a business strategy has previously
been explored and advocated in the work of Winter and
Szulanski [43], who build their replication arguments on
very tangible, chain and franchise like businesses, using
examples such as [6], who explains cloning of units in
chains, and [33] who describes the case of adaptation
and tuning of the model with traces of the origins of the
concept.
Winter and Szulanski [43] contrast two views on
replication: exploitation and exploration and highlight
them as two phases of replication. Exploitation, that is,
repeated replication of a simple recipe or formula, which
is assumed to be known and reproduced accurately each
time it is replicated [43, p.730]; and exploration,
whereby a business model is discovered and refined by
choosing the components for replication in suitable
locations, developing capabilities to routinize
knowledge transfer, and maintaining the model once it
has been replicated [43, p.731]. The transition between
the two is a critical point of creating capabilities that
support the replication processes and activities to
follow.
Organisational theory suggests that replication is
difficult and therefore organisations tend to merely
adapt to the specificities of the market [14].
Nevertheless, [33] distinguished between firm’s
adaptive responses and creative responses. The latter are
more likely to be innovation-driven and not just
adaptations to the market specificities. Weick [42]
however suggested that a firm’s ability to influence,
construct or enact its environment is dependent on the
size. The notion of size in the context of digital ventures,
in particular in their early days, has a different
connotation than the industrial scaling logic, whereby
companies exert market power, or rely on economies of
scale. In the context of digital ventures that grow by
replicating, in order for replication to work it “requires
the capability to recreate complex, imperfectly

understood, and partly tacit productive processes” [43,
p.731]. Therefore, in digital ventures size-related
benefits emerge as replication capability evolves with
the number of replications, and learning spaces that
increase with more markets to replicate into as well as
more trials and errors to learn from. With this, the ability
to spot and leverage a pattern increases the number of
opportunities to scale through replication, in a way that
creates complex landscapes of innovation [5] and not
just market adaptation.
The capabilities to support the transition exist in
forms of knowledge assets codified in frameworks,
blueprint, templates, best practices, or according to [43]
in a form of a historic template. These have often been
used in contexts of global roll-outs of standardised
information systems, where organisations face
challenges of balancing local needs with global
standards, standardisation and flexibility. Building on
[27], [43] define a template as a guiding example for
reproducing success enjoyed at a particular original
setting [43, p.734]. Shapiro and Varian [35] reflect on
flexibility of such a pattern as an important aspect of
successful replication. A pattern needs to be principled
but flexible enough in order to understand the actual
core of the success of the business, contrasting with the
extreme emphasis on precise replication. In the context
of replication in digital ventures, powered by the
modular, and malleable nature of technology, ventures
extend replication with an aspect of generativity [46]
present in the process of scaling through pattern
replication.
2.4. Scaling through generative pattern replication
Alexander [3] views patterns as responses to
problems which occur over and over again in a
particular environment. Patterns are generic, and build
on specialization; since patterns can be used again and
again, without the need for using it the same way twice.
Gamma [15], building on this work, defines patterns as
“descriptions […] that are customized to solve a general
design problem in a particular context”.
In line with Alexander’s understanding of the
generativity of the patterns, we envision the original
‘master’ pattern as providing the structure that enables
the creation of the ‘mutated’ patterns in the most
appropriate way to the setting and problem they are
trying to solve. Each new pattern embodies and carries
the structure of the ‘master’ pattern, despite being a
solution that had not be applied before, but within the
same framework of guidelines that form a generative
structure of the pattern. This enables teams to create
their own solutions when solving problems in an infinite
variety of ways, replicating broad ideas and components
instead of specific solutions. Alexander [3] argues that
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generative patterns are not just collections of good ideas
and practices, but rather coherent structures that allow
to generate coherent entities and solutions.
The balance of structure and guidelines with
innovation and creativity is central to Alexander’s way
of thinking about generative patterns. Based on this we
believe a generative scaling pattern is both generic and
specific at the same time, and can create indefinite
recombination possibilities. The pattern, once attained,
introduces an element of standardisation to the
replication process and can help to allocate resources
and make strategic decisions that are more effective
over time, whilst preventing unnecessary duplication of
efforts. Instead of designing resource-consuming
strategies for each country, elements of the pattern could
be used as tools to draw the necessary resources
together. Furthermore, the more markets the pattern was
used to expand into, and learnt from, the better the
pattern can become. Experiences and learnings that
evolve with scaling are documented and formalised then
fed into the scaling pattern.
On the other hand, patterns translated for local
demands increase the number of possible solutions and
innovations available at any point in time. This can help
deliver novel, fast and effective responses to an
emerging opportunity, even in a non-existing market.
Patterns not only serve as a basis for localised decision
making, but also as a tool for unlocking innovation
opportunities, for teams and individuals, regardless of
their expertise and experience. Documented patterns
can allow organisations to bridge a gap in understanding
for non-experts and experts shuffled in a matrix
structure. This is crucial in the increasingly
multicultural environment digital ventures operate in,
where challenges of coordination collide with the need
to retain the start-up culture and team agility. Generative
pattern replication distributes the power to innovate
beyond top decision makers.

3. Methods
We have carried out an in-depth study of a
ridesharing venture called BlaBlaCar. During this study
BlaBlaCar boasted a user base of twenty-five million
members that doubled last year. Since company’s
expansion into its first foreign market in 2009,
BlaBlaCar rapidly grew into twenty-two countries,
through a mix of acquisitions, and new market entries,
spanning across three continents. We selected
BlaBlaCar as an extreme case [16] because of its rapid
scaling in an international context. BlaBlaCar also
represents a new breed of digital ventures with similar
growth trajectories, such as the previously mentioned
AirBnB and Uber. This offers opportunities for
generating findings and theory that can help explain the

user base scaling mechanisms of other digital ventures.
Further to this, we gained access to the company and
were presented with an opportunity to collect rich
primary data, which we supplemented with secondary
data, spanning our data analysis across three sources:
interviews, archival data and participant observation.
Rapid scaling does not allow for a constant
organisational structure, but current teams are divided
into Members Relations, Growth, Tech, New Business,
Product, Communications, Marketing & Design, and
Admin. Within this division there are local and global
teams split based on their activities as either being on
the ground on a day to day basis, or offering support and
coordination to local teams within global strategic
vision. At the time of data collection there were twentytwo local teams spread across fifteen countries. We
conducted fifty-eight semi structured, audio taped
interviews with country managers, members of local
and global teams.
Archival data included reports and project
descriptions, as well as various company internal and
external presentation material. In addition, the
researcher spent four months in the organization as a
participant observer, attending meetings, workshops,
presentations, and training sessions. During this time
several informal interviews were also conducted.
Following [23] theorisation from process data we
conducted several stages of data analysis, mapping out
tasks and outputs for each respective stage. We began
by filtering and labelling the data with open coding. This
has allowed us to trace instances of pattern and
replication. We then constructed a case narrative to
depict the evolution of the replication logic at
BlaBlaCar, identifying three phases. We further
explored the data with selective coding to understand
the linkages between different elements of pattern
replication. Through this we arrived at the current
visualisation of the process of scaling of user base
through pattern replication, initiating explanations of
several elements of generative pattern replication.

4. The case of ridesharing
BlaBlaCar is one of the digital pioneers of
ridesharing that successfully built a marketplace for
passengers wishing to travel and drivers with empty car
seats on long distance trips. This niche service quickly
established a foothold in the native French market, that
grew into a single European marketplace, and
eventually into Asia and Latin America. Figure 1 shows
the numerous diverse markets BlaBlaCar entered since
its inception in 2006.
The marketplace was achieved by a mix of acquihiring, that is taking over small European ridesharing
startups, whilst hiring the entire teams (e.g. Superdojazd
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in Poland or Rides in Mexico), as well as launching
clusters of geographically and culturally similar
countries with high levels of cross border trips (e.g.
Podorozhniki in Ukraine and Russia or AutoHop in
Hungary, Croatia, Serbia and Romania). A number of
markets were also built up from scratch (e.g. Spain, UK,
Germany).
By tracing the events that preceded global
ridesharing success, we create a scaling timeline
consisting of three phases. Phase 1 (2006-09) was
bracketed as a garage phase where the product was
incepted, highlighting a period of development of the
core of the business model. Phase 2 (2010-2013)
indicates first instance of cross boundary knowledge
transfer and business model replication – into Spain, as
well as rapid scaling into another nine markets in
Western Europe with monetisation bottlenecks. Phase 3
(2014- ongoing) is characterised by replication outside
of business model tested Western Europe into Eastern
Europe, Asia and Latin America, fuelled by large
fundraising episodes. In this phase we observe
monetisation, and booking system replication as more
weighted and rolled out in stages as a result of
leveraging and transferring of the stock of knowledge
accumulated from previous monetisation and booking
replications.

The service started gaining momentum in 2007,
when a series of transport industry strikes left few other
travel options for the French public and a large number
of signups created positive liquidity, matching between
drivers and passengers and their travel plans. This was
the turning point in the development of BlaBlaCar. This
demand spike led to the opening of their first office in
Paris, and subsequent hiring of their first employee in
2008.
An initial consumer to consumer (C2C) offering was
expanded into a business to business (B2B) platform,
selling services to local companies and authorities. B2B
quickly became a source of revenue in contrast to a free
C2C platform, which on the other hand was growing
faster with fewer resources. Despite the profitability,
B2B required high client customisation and this had
little scalability potential, making BlaBlaCar rethink the
business model. BlaBlaCar spotted positive feedback
loops that would allow rapid growth to their user base in
both France and internationally, as to redirect its focus
entirely to scaling the C2C platform. Scalability
becomes the centre of the team’s focus:
“[We] realized that C2C marketplace is growing much
faster and on its own and in a more efficient way with a lot of
traction. Much more than the B2B platform that's less scalable
with a lot of education, communication skills required…It was
a different business model but that's not where the growth is
so they needed to make their bets”, Global Team Member.

Up until the introduction of the current business
model at the end of 2011/early 2012 Covoiturage
trialled a series of business model options. The move
towards the right business model and ‘proof of concept’
in France resulted in BlaBlaCar raising €600,000 in
2009. Following this, with the right product and
financial resources, BlaBlaCar was able to launch the
first market outside of France:
“And then from having the right product then you start
getting traction in the market, investors can see that, they back
you with money and suddenly you have the budget to really
explode. And also hire people or acquire other teams…”,
Growth Team Member.
Figure 1. Market growth timeline

Phase 1 (2006-2009) commenced with a launch of
the company Covoiturage, and the first website. This
phase can be described as a ‘garage phase’, where the
concept of online ridesharing was being refined.
Covoiturage enjoyed organic growth with little
investment and effort, based on the attractiveness of the
digitally enabled ridesharing. The main focus of the
phase is the development of the core of the product:
“There was a three to four-year garage phase, right,
where things weren’t quite right yet. I think ratings for
instance were introduced in 2009 which speaks to having the
right product, right. It takes time to have really the product
that is going to crack the market...”, Growth Team Member.

In December 2009 the company announced an
expansion to Spain replicating the service and product
under the name Comuto, and launched its first mobile
application.
Phase 2 (2010-2013). In 2010 further €1.25 million
investment was secured. In the same year European
transport infrastructure got shaken up by an eruption of
volcano Eyjafjallajökull, causing air travel disruption
across Europe and creating a surge in demand, and
subsequent high price and low availability of other
‘traditional’ means of transport. This event created
undoubted traffic to the BlaBlaCar website and
heightened public and media interest across Europe.
In December 2011 BlaBlaCar received a further
investment of $10 million. In May 2011 BlaBlaCar
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entered its third market – the UK and reached its first
millionth members. At this point the team started seeing
patterns of growth, similarities in markets and
opportunities for replication of the French market
scaling trajectories:
“At the time, we were starting to operate in three countries
and we already started to see that we could draw patterns from
one country and apply it to another one, find levers that
worked somewhere and try them somewhere else. That was the
focus at first then you grew around that...”, Growth Team
Manager.

As a result of drawing on these patterns, the year of
2012 saw rapid expansion across Europe, starting in
Italy in May with an acquisition of a local startup
PostoinAuto. In October BlaBlaCar launched in
Portugal, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, as well
as Poland by acquiring another on the ground start up
Superdojazd. The focus on scalability created the need
for a stronger international brand. Toward the end of
2012 the company consolidated Covoiturage and
Comuto under one global brand and name – BlaBlaCar:
“The first name of the company was Covoiturage, which
means ridesharing in French, which is the wrong name
because you’re never going to expand. So, initially its easy
because it’s good for SEO, so it’s kind of an easy way to start
your business as an Internet company, but it doesn’t scale,
right, so we had to rebrand”, COO, speaking at Webrazzi.

BlaBlaCar had on place the product, the team of
founders, nine markets, the brand, and the finance, and
so they began the project of monetizing the service. The
finalised business model, online booking system, was to
become transactional, based on an inbuilt booking
which levies a fee on each trip. The nature of the system
allowed to maximise scalability. More first time users
were attracted to a legitimised and governed ridesharing
service, as the booking system added a layer of security
and trust to the platform. The system simplified the
booking process and on board logistics of a ride,
reduced cancellations and improved members’
commitment. A member of a global team summarises
the role of the booking system as follows:
“…Our belief is the more present that we can be as a third
party inside that connection, the better it is because we can
add value, add confidence, add service layers, add customer
support. So everything that we can, any way we can structure
the transaction and be present, not just enable but be present
throughout that transaction, is a good thing for us”, Global
Team Member.

The booking systems were first rolled out in France
and Spain. The successes and errors from the transition
in France and Spain were transferred across other
markets, and became the basis for launching all
consecutive local systems. A member of a global team
emphasises the role of sharing and replication in
booking transition:
“…The booking transition in Spain which was the first one
after France was a bit difficult to handle because there was a

great backlash of the community whereas now we’ve
transitioned many other countries, progressively there was
very different strategic approach especially on the Comms
side. And what you have seen what is happening currently in
Italy is much more smoother actually in terms of change, so
we are seeing how much we are sharing more and more
really”, Global Team Member.

In April 2013 BlaBlaCar stood up to its main
European competitor, a local German ridesharing start
up, and launched in Germany, announcing five million
members.
Phase 3 (2014-ongoing). Shortly after launching
Germany, BlaBlaCar makes a decision to step out of
Western and Central Europe, and into Russia and
Ukraine in February 2014 through the acquisition of
Podorozhniki. In summer 2014 an investment
announcement was made: $100 million would be made
available to bankroll BlaBlaCar’s expansion into Asia
and South America. Company launches its first country
outside Europe – Turkey in September 2014 and
announces plans to launch India, Mexico, and Brazil. At
this point BlaBlaCar boasted 200% year on year growth,
with 10 million registered users. Continuing with
monetization many other countries have initiated the
switch to online booking, which in terms of both the
product features and the roll out process was altered in
light of every previous booking system launch. As a
result, several booking system configurations were
developed to suit the local needs and market intricacies
and many countries begun the monetization with a nonpayment booking system, preparing the community for
a smooth introduction of the payment:
“So the challenge here is really to prepare this in the right
way so there’s a lot of work planned maybe a year ahead to,
especially in terms of payment …, we want to scale as much
as we can and to have one product that scales everywhere in
the world as much as we can, but when it comes to payment
it’s just very country-specific”, Global Team Member.

In September 2015 $200 million were raised, which
allowed BlaBlaCar to launch in India in January 2015;
the following month the acquisition of AutoHop and
further expansion into Eastern Europe took place
(launching Hungary, Croatia, Serbia and Romania, in
March of that year). In April BlaBlaCar announces
merger with a German competitor – Carpooling,
transforming it into largest long distance ridesharing
service in Europe and the world.
In the same month, BlaBlaCar acquired Rides and
launched Mexico whilst UK was being transferred to the
online booking system, making it the third country to
monetize. For the rest of the markets the gradual switch
to the booking system was ongoing. The platform
created by the booking system had opened multiple
partnership and service extension opportunities for
BlaBlaCar, such as one with global insurance giant
AXA, offering additional insurance for all members,
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rapidly increasing the value to users, boosting trust and
attracting older demographic to the service. A global
team member comments on the value of the booking
system:
“In that sense, in itself, [booking system] brings a lot of
value and on top of that we can track and we can have a lot of
knowledge then you can get many other things on top of it.
Partnerships, extended business lines, extended services…”,
Global Team Member.

Later that year BlaBlaCar received a $1.6 billion
valuation making it one of the Unicorn club companies,
putting it alongside giants such as Uber, Airbnb, Spotify
and Skyscanner. November 2015, another Latin
American country was launched – Brazil, and in early
2016 BlaBlaCar announced it launching Czech
Republic and Slovakia.

5. Scaling through pattern replication
What can be traced from the case story is a gradual
introduction of replication of learnings into global
projects adjusted for local demands, such as in the
example of their booking system and monetization roll
out. The spotting and leveraging of patterns comes
through initially in early country launches, in the
consolidation towards a global recognisable brand, and
in the search for a booking system with the maximum
capacity to scale across boundaries.
We traced several elements that form a structure for
replication at BlaBlaCar. We found that scaling through
pattern replication rests on three pillars: artifact, flexible
organising, and value framing.
A successful scaling strategy or technique gets
reapplied, and becomes a pattern that can be replicated
in other settings. Learnings from applying a pattern are
captured as a framework in a playbook, and in this way
disseminated across all teams.
“Playbook is basically the know-how through trials and
errors and successes that’s been formalised into a set of
reasonable principles and processes that can be transferred to
other teams easily so you can tell them “hey, this is what
works/doesn’t work, this is the right approach, this is
something that might or might not work and this is something
that surely won’t work”, Growth Team Member.

So, the first element of scaling through pattern
replication is a physical manifestation of the pattern in
the form of an artifact – a playbook. Any team member
can access and replicate a pattern from a playbook,
using it as a tool. Best practices in replicating a pattern
are fed back to the playbook constantly and a pattern is
then further circulated into multiple new versions of the
pattern in local markets. The playbook acts as a
conversion tool that allows the teams to process local
learning into shared global best practices, that can then
be adapted locally: either across boundaries or in the

market where it originated as an advanced version of the
original solution.
The playbook embodies the pattern and serves as a
carrier for knowledge, but it is only an extension of the
learnings, held by ‘experts’ that have previously and
successfully replicated a pattern. Replication becomes
possible with high market and team mobility, required
to pull resources when replicating the pattern effectively
and rapidly. So, the second element of scaling through
pattern replication is flexible organising – agile team
structuring that allows to maintain a level of
synchronisation across teams and boundaries, allocating
patterns and team resources where they are needed most.
Building on the playbook and the leveraging of agile
teams allows to balance new business opportunities with
growth of existing projects, local and global growth
context, the need for operational, day to day running of
the business with forward looking innovation
strategizing.
“So when building something you actually think that it
should be scalable. So when structuring the team you will
think already that we’re going to grow and you think “okay,
so when we are going to be fifty how like would these
processes be applicable or not”. So can I build such processes
which would be applicable now as well as in ten years, you
know, it’s something like that. And if your answer is ‘no’ then
you should take this into consideration and take into account
that “OK, now I am building something for one year, in one
year we will need to change”, but ideally you try to find a way
which would be scalable and applicable for twenty people, as
well as thirty, as well as fifty”, Growth Team Member.

The third element, value framing, is comprised of 10
values, drawn up internally by the team, that govern
everyday practices and processes in the organization.
Values create a common ‘language’ and decision
making reference point that facilitates boundary
crossing and replication.
“I mean the values are very much like…kind of prophecies
you can point to… I remember I was speaking to one of the
senior guys here and I was struggling working with maybe 5
people in a cross project and also across a few countries and
they deal with like 30-40 people. I’m like “how do you bring
everybody to consensus without just saying ‘no, this is the way
it’s going to be?” And he just pointed to the values and said
you nudge them and in doing that everyone feels equal and
there isn’t so much of like a sort of residue of politics…”,
Global Team Member.

Artifact, flexible organising and value framing
create generic guidelines, a ‘safety net’ for replicating
the pattern, in an autonomous way, on individual and
company level, globally and locally, but within the
overall company strategy and vision.
“…we need to spend a lot of time understanding how to
prioritise. So making sure that all markets get what they need.
And beyond that it also requires us to set up frameworks. So
rather than having a set, you know, set of rules, we actually
set a framework that countries can adapt to their local needs”,
Growth Team Member.
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6. Discussion and conclusions
The unique nature of digital technology [45],
leveraged by digital ventures as they seek to address the
needs of users, seems to trigger soaring scaling
trajectories that lie outside our conventional
understanding of economics of scale [cf. 9]. Stimulated
by winner-takes-it-all perceptions [11, 32], digital
ventures attempt to scale rapidly across market
boundaries displaying varied market conditions. As this
phenomenon becoming more common, we need to
enrich our understanding of scaling in the digital age,
especially across market boundaries. To this end, we

studied BlaBlaCar, which scaled its business into
twenty-two markets in roughly ten years’ time. We view
this scaling as a process of pattern replication successful strategies proven elsewhere, applied in
solving emerging challenges in new settings. Our
research aimed to trace this process, understand it and
propose a model to explain it.
Our research at BlaBlaCar uncovered the process
and its elements by which digital ventures can extract
and leverage patterns in scaling its user base across
boundaries. The main contribution is the process model
of Scaling through Generative Pattern Replication (see
Figure 2) that offers a novel perspective on scaling of
digital ventures.

Figure 2. A process model of scaling through generative pattern replication

Concept
Generative Pattern Replication

Definition
A process of replicating a scaling pattern (a generic solution to a particular setting)
through the interaction between the three components: artifact, value framing and
flexible organising, creating positive externalities for further pattern replication.

Artifact

Flexible Organizing
Value Framing

User Base
Cross Boundary Growth
(= sum of all markets)

Compound Growth
(> sum of all markets)

A tangible embodiment of a scaling pattern that collates the outcomes of pattern
replication through trials, errors and successes, formalising them into componentstools that can be easily transferred and leveraged across boundaries.
A digital venture’s agile team structuring for maintaining a constant state of
synchronisation across teams and boundaries.
Digital venture’s cultural values translated into a set of generic principles guiding
internal processes and practices within the scaling through replication organising
logic.
The number of users who have registered for a digital service.
Digital venture’s growth by rapidly launching new markets through generative
pattern replication, aggregating the existing know how from previous launches. As
the number of markets increases with cross boundary growth, network effects
incentives for users become stronger, increasing the user base.
Digital venture’s growth by generating and synchronising knowledge across
boundaries, redistributing the outcomes of generative pattern replication. As the
value delivered to users increases with generative replication of projects,
partnerships, product features, etc., making the venture more attractive, the user base
grows.

4783

These patterns consist of components of different
nature: physical artifact, serving as a shared resource
used to collate the learnings when replicating patterns;
agile team structure reflected in flexible organising that
ensures cross team synchronisation when replicating;
value framing that leverages venture’s cultural values to
guide decision making, and maintain the teams focus on
the scalability of replication.
We understand generative pattern replication’s
(GPR’s) impact on the growth of the user base in two
ways: through cross boundary growth, which allows
digital ventures to launch new markets quickly by
leveraging the patterns, but also compound growth;
increasing the value to the users, as each market from
the outset contains the patterns from all other markets.
When combined, these extend the size of the user base
in terms of the number of markets, (creating stronger
network effects,) and shared knowledge, (attracting user
by delivering more value faster.).
We contribute to the emerging literature on digital
innovation [e.g., 44, 45] by offering a novel explanation
of the processes that underpin digital ventures’
ambitions to scale their user base rapidly through GPR,
as exemplified in the case of BlaBlaCar. We highlight
that replication as a strategy [43] essential for the growth
of the digital venture. Rather than simply relying on
adaptation to market conditions, our approach involves
leveraging coherent structures [3] that evolve with size
and replication, allowing digital ventures to create
innovation opportunities, whilst solving daily
challenges, thorough the process of GPR.
Additionally, we contribute to the understanding of
user base growth [21] by outlining the process by which
digital ventures can overcome market variation
internationally, conceptualizing this growth as
multidimensional and as increasing the knowledge
transferred between the markets through replication.
There are a few limitations of the research. First, our
research builds on an in-depth case study. Future
research should consider including a wider variety of
cases to allow for comparative analysis. Furthermore, it
would have been useful to have access to more powerful
data on the dependent variable, that is, user base. This
would have allowed more careful analysis of how
particular replication acts influenced the scaling
process. Further research, with access to a more
comprehensive dataset on the user base across time,
might be able to trace variation in the replication acts
and offer a dynamic theory of this interesting
phenomenon.
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